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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code § 78-2a-3(h) (1996) as this is an appeal from an order entered in a domestic 
relations case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
FIRST ISSUE: Appellant/Respondent's (hereinafter Mr. Betteridge) First Issue 
claims the trial court abused its discretion in finding that cohabitation did not exist. This 
First Issue is a mixture of law and fact. The trial court found as facts that no common 
residence had been established and that no sexual conduct evidencing a conjugal 
relationship had been established. Based upon those findings, the trial court reached the 
legal conclusion that cohabitation did not exist so as to terminate the alimony Mr. 
Betteridge was ordered to pay to Appellee/Petitioner (hereinafter Ms. Betteridge). 
SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH ISSUES: Mr. Betteridge's Second, Third, 
and Fourth Issues claim "abuse of discretion" by the trial court when, after reaching the 
conclusion that cohabitation did not exist so as to terminate the alimony order, the trial 
court found Mr. Betteridge in contempt of the Order of the court, granted Ms. Betteridge 
a judgment for alimony arrearages, and awarded Ms. Betteridge the attorneys fees and 
costs incurred in defending against the cohabitation claim. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The determination of whether given circumstances constitute cohabitation require 
the application of the terms of a court order to a given set of facts. The process is in 
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reality a mixed question of fact and law . . ." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 
Utah 1985); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Ut. App. 1996). When 
challenging the adequacy of the trial court's findings of fact that no common residence 
was established and that no sexual conduct evidencing a conjugal relationship had been 
established the appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support 
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. 
Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, \ 10 n. 5; 19 P.3d 1005, 1008; see also Sigg 
v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 913 n. 7 (Ut. App. 1995) 
A "clear abuse of discretion" standard of review applies to the trial court's 
conclusion of law that the elements of cohabitation had not been proven so as to trigger 
the statutory termination of alimony, and its orders finding Mr. Betteridge in contempt of 
an Order of the court, Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1976); 
Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, f 8; 973 P.2d 988, 990, granting Ms. Betteridge a 
judgment for alimony arrearages, and awarding Ms. Betteridge her attorneys fees and 
costs incurred in defending against the cohabitation claim. Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 
012, 1 33; 973 P.2d 431, 439; Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030, n. 4 (Ut. App. 
1992); see also Utah Code § 30-3-3 (1998). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal seeks review of the finding of the trial court that cohabitation did not 
exist so as to terminate the order of alimony contained within the original Decree of 
Divorce. Mr. Betteridge also challenges the trial court's order holding him in contempt 
of the Order of the court requiring the payment of alimony, the trial court's entry of 
judgment against Mr. Betteridge for delinquent alimony payments, and the awarding of 
the attorneys fees and costs incurred by Ms. Betteridge in seeking the enforcement of the 
Order of the court. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is the second appeal filed by Mr. Betteridge to orders entered by the trial 
court in the case, this court having previously affirmed the Decree of Divorce. (Utah 
Court of Appeals, No. 20030065; non-published opinion). 
The Decree of Divorce [Rec. 237-240] was entered on December 23, 2002, 
pursuant to the trial to the court on September 27, 2002, and its ruling on October 8, 
2002. The Decree contained a judgment for alimony at $1,600 per month in favor of Ms. 
Betteridge for the period commencing February, 2002 through October, 2002, and 
ordered continuing alimony at $1,600 per month to be paid by Mr. Betteridge to Ms. 
Betteridge for no longer than the duration of the marriage (25 years) or until otherwise 
terminated by law. 
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Mr. Betteridge refused to pay the judgment for alimony as granted in the Decree 
of Divorce ana ,,, January, 2003 u v.. continuing Garnishment was issued and 
sen ^ d i ipc - Betteridge's emploj er to effect collection of the judgment awarded in 
the Decree of Divorce. [Rec. 342-363] 
Mr. Betteridge also refusec ;, , ^ -he ongoing alimony as ordered by the court 
and an Orri- •* S!-~- ''-•- • '• •• ' ' *tf-mr>t \Y;K J:;=: :! - r:inua:\ ^ ™ , lJ rP;v ?^2~ 
293], hearing before the Domestic Commissioner on January M). J003 the 
Commissioner certified to the .. for an evidentiary hearing the issue u 
Betteridge's contempt and recommended entry of judgment for alimony arrearages which 
had accrued for November, 2002 through the date of hearing. [Rec. 335-338] The Order 
and Judgment was entered June _;\ . . ;.JC. :vo ? OJ 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on July 21. 2XJ<JJ. The case was selected for 
mediation, but was not resolved. The court ordered Mr Betteridge io file his brief by 
May 12, 2004. A stip ulated exte tisioii • :: f tin ic w as grants.. . > jane _. . . . . . . 
"lodged" with the court on June 2, 2004, with a subsequent, significantly changed brief 
"filed" with the court on June 9, 2004. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The evidentiary hearing on the issue of Mr. Betteridge's contempt was heard by 
the trial court on February l1'. _v. •
 :i , . ^ ;^ * .>ruu. • J<v JUlo [KCC, - w: ai a a 
subsequent evident! a 
Betteridge's claim that he should not be held in contempt for failing to pay alimony on 
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the grounds that he did not have the ability to pay. [Note: All volumes of the 
transcripts of hearing will be hereinafter referred to as "Tr." followed by the page 
number and line of the transcript] 
The court received items into evidence and heard the testimony of Ms. Betteridge 
[Tr. 7-19; 233-259], a former co-worker of Ms. Betteridge [Tr. 20-66], two of the 
children of Mr. and Mrs. Betteridge [Tr. 67-78; 79-86], the individual to whom Ms. 
Betteridge rented a room in her apartment [Tr. 86-109], three neighbors of Ms. Betteridge 
[Tr. 121-150; 150-163; 205-212], Mr. Betteridge [Tr. 213-217], Mr. Betteridge's sister 
[Tr. 163-185], and Ms. Betteridge's father, mother and sister [Tr. 185-195; 196-205; 218-
233]. 
The court stated its understanding of the requirements of the law, its findings of 
fact, its application of the law to the facts, and its conclusion that the elements had not 
been met and that cohabitation was not found to exist. [Tr. 296: 18-25; 297: 1-17] 
Subsequent to its finding that cohabitation did not exist, the court proceeded to 
find Mr. Betteridge in contempt but accepted Mr. Betteridge's argument that he relied 
upon cohabitation as the reason why he did not pay alimony. Because the court found a 
good faith basis for Mr. Betteridge's non-payment, he directed counsel to propose a 
means by which Mr. Betteridge would bring his obligations into complete compliance 
rather than be subject to sanctions for deliberate avoidance of his alimony obligation. 
[Tr. 300: 4-20] 
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Because the court found that Ms. Betteridge had prevailed in her proceeding to 
enforce the order of the court and defend against the cohabitation case, she was entitled to 
and was awarded reasonable attorney's fees. FTr. 300: 21-24] 
At the evidentiary hearing held June 13, 2003 [R. 831] and after receiving items 
into evidence and hearing the testimony of Mr. Betteridge ; , a.e court stated its 
finding that f\ ir Betteridge wa s aware of the order of the Court: requiri ng payment of 
$1,600 per month in alimony, that he had the ability to pay as ordered, and that he refused 
to pay as ordered. || »-4:JJ--: . ^ .;c court further stated that it was struggling 
to find that Mr. Betteridge could pay more than $1,600 per month and thus might not 
have the ability to pay on the accrued arrearages, and that the only payments previously 
made by Mr. Betteridge were the payments made as a result of the garnishments. [ I i , 85: 
10-22] 
The court did not award Ms. Betteridge attorney fees for the hearing on June 13, 
2 A . oecause . ^ ilendgc * Iluancial loiidiliuii mi Il iiulai liul NIL uuiul vwis 
offering him some relief by limiting the amount he was required to pay per month to 
$1,600.00 [Tr. 87; 4-10] and ordered that Mr. Betteridge could purge himself of the 
coiitempl In Jibiiliii III Hi ml iiillli i Inr [tinmen! oi '(.SUiniiiil pi i pj>dk\l' b I I 
Betteridge. [Tr. 93 : 5-23; R. 593-596] 
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RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
The court recited the factors upon which its decision was based and the reasoning 
in which the court engaged in arriving at its conclusion. [Tr. 297:17-25; 298; 299; 300: 
1-4] 
1. Certain of Mr. Betteridge's Statement of Facts at pp. 3-7 of his brief and 
identified below mischaracterize the testimony in the attempt to mislead the Court: 
a. Statement of Fact 1 states "Ms. Betteridge had another man . . . living in 
her apartment." Tr. 8:4-12. In answer to the question posed at Tr. 8:4-12: "Since 
you've been living in that apartment in Midvale, has anyone else lived there with 
you?" Ms. Betteridge answered: "For a short time I had rented a room because I 
needed the extra income because I was receiving nothing from my ex-husband". 
b. Statement of Fact 2 states "Ms. Betteridge admitted Mr. Reinen spent 
the night in her apartment from October, 2002 to mid-January, 2003." Tr. 8:17-20; 
9:1-2. The question posed at Tr. 8:17 was "And when did he move in?" Ms. 
Betteridge answered: "Under the circumstances he started renting the room from 
me the beginning of October . . . 2002." Similarly, Mr. Reinen's testimony was 
that he didn't spend the night in the apartment until he moved in as a roommate to 
help her pay her rent. Tr. 87:12-16. 
c. Statement of Fact 5 states "Mr. Reinen testified Ms. Betteridge left a 
key under the mat so he could access the apartment when Ms. Betteridge was not 
at home." Tr. 88:16-22. Mr. Reinen's testimony actually states: "Well, when I 
was staying there there was times where she would leave the key under the mat so 
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I would be able to get in. That was very rare,
 A A most of my time at my 
house." I i .88:20-22. 
d. Stateme ' ; * i s "Is li R einen testified he primarih : 
from Ms. Betteridge's apartment because -H *e litigation involving the 
termination of alimony". Il i i'iK::> 11, Mi. . omen's testimony actually states: 
"Wei 1 ! i lostlj bee m use of this stuff that's haprur / ^v- . v>rh u- J ' ^ 
apartment, so it wasn't so crov .. * . Well, just because, you know, I didn't want 
to cause any waves between an\body. ^u. you know... I was just, you know 
88:5 * - r •- •, ?»,. .- -v . ;;\<: • *: .\ A i;- in * . i r rnn^prv-M-; 
in his own apartment and the circumstances allowing him to move back to his own 
apartment in mid-January. I i 9 9:10 25; 100:1 23; 101 ; I ; 
e. Statement of Fact 24 states "Ms. Betteridge's counsel admitted that his 
client had testified at the original divorce trial she had engaged in an extramarital 
affai rhis exchange was part of closing argument to the court in 
response f opposing counsel's argument that the court: should presume •'••.• 
existence of sexual conduct because of testimony given at trial I r 266: I 7 -21 . 
l i - L . . ^L_; . . . . I - J w U i i J C L K . - i . . . . . . . . J ' „ ; * K ! i k \ .. . . . . _ . . , _ i: dhC [ilea / . ; . 
determination that fault would not influence the judgment in granting the divorce. 
Tr. 271:25; 272:1-14. Including this reference in the Statement of Facts in simply 
an attempt to reai gue 1"\ ft: Betteridge' s position inth z ti la 1 cc in it. \ 
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2. Examples of evidence in the record in addition to those identified by Mr. 
Betteridge which support the findings of the trial court and which were not marshaled by 
Mr. Betteridge include: 
a. Jonnathen was residing temporarily in the apartment of Ms. Betteridge. 
i) Testimony of Arthur Milne at Tr. 190:21-25; 191:4-8; 
ii) Witness Corby Bray at Tr. 222:18-25; 223; 232:14-25; 233: 
3-10; 
iii) Witness Gwen Milne at Tr. 199:3-12; 200: 6-15 
iv) Witness Brent A. Betteridge at Tr. 82:3-6; 
v) Witness Aaron McTee at Tr. 149:2-25; 
vi) Witness Sherry Shepherd at Tr. 207:10-25; 208; 209:1-16; 
b. Jonnathen did not have a key to Ms. Betteridge's apartment. 
i) Witness Corby Bray at Tr. 232:14-25; 233:3-10; 
ii) Witness Aisha Shavazz at Tr. 154:10-14; 158:3-9. 
c. Jonnathen was not in Ms. Betteridge's apartment when Ms. Betteridge 
wasn't, except on rare occasions, and Jonnathen did not have the intention or 
practice to be in the apartment when she wasn't there, 
i) Witness Aisha Shavazz at Tr. 161:18-20; 
ii) Witness Gwyn Milne at Tr. 205:3-8. 
d. Some kind of romantic interest or relationship clearly exists based on 
pictures, gifts, kissing, attention, but that alone does not establish sexual conduct 
evidencing a conjugal association. 
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i) Witness Arthur Milne at Ti 18S 6-25; . 
ii) Witness Owen Mime 
iii) Witness Shawn Betteridge at I r. 69:11-25; 70; 72: 77:10-25; 
78:1-6 : . 
^ Witness Brent A. Bettridge at ;. -> ,.-t 5. ^ : „ ~ ~ : . ^..> . l-
v) vViinc^ VaronMcTee > i- •" 1 -:>- 12*5:2-20. • 
3. Mr. Betteridge's Brief was "lodged" with the clerk of the above entitled court 
on June 2, . . ^euenuge s unci containing significant changes wa* :. . 
with the clerk of above entitled court on June 9, 2004. 
Significant substantive differences exist in the Brief "lodged" on June 2, 2004 
andthe .>.iw. - ^ r.ii. ; . . .. >JI;- \ .S: 
a. Paragraph entitled "Statement of Facts" in June 2, 2004 Brief at pp. 4-5 
compared to June 9. 2004 Brief at pp. 3-7; 
b, Argumei.. , _/•> , . „:.ipai ed to June 9, 200 ;:l 
Brief at pp. 9-12; 
gument II in June 2, 2004 Brief at p. ° compared to June 95 2004 
Unci ..ill I I II. •-..-• • . / -.-... ..
 : ; : . , ..-• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court's findings that the elements of cohabitation were not proven are 
He is required to present in comprehensive and fastidious order every scrap of competent 
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evidence introduced at trial which supports the finding that there was no common 
residence for Ms. Betteridge and Jonnathen Reinen, and that there was no sexual conduct 
which was conjugal in nature. Mr. Betteridge cites to only some of the testimony of Ms. 
Betteridge and Mr. Reinen, fails to cite to any of the testimony of the 11 other witnesses, 
and simply re-argues his position that simply because Mr. Reinen paid rent it must be 
deemed admitted that Ms. Betteridge's apartment became a common residence. The 
testimony that the arrangement was temporary and in fact terminated after 3-1/2 months 
is disregarded, and the testimony regarding the restricted use of and access to the 
apartment is disregarded. With respect to sexual conduct evidencing a conjugal 
relationship, Mr. Betteridge points out testimony regarding a photo displayed, gifts 
exchanged at Christmas, kissing and attention paid in public and merely reargues his 
position at trial that the court must conclude that sexual conduct existed. No argument is 
advanced regarding the need for establishing the existence of a conjugal relationship of 
which the sexual conduct was a part. Having failed to marshal the evidence, Mr. 
Betteridge further fails to meet his burden of demonstrating that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. 
No Abuse of Discretion is Shown. In failing to meet his burden of demonstrating 
that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, the fact that no cohabitation existed 
must be accepted as true. If no cohabitation exists, the statutory provisions of Utah Code 
§30-3-5(9) (1998) that terminate alimony upon a finding of cohabitation are not 
applicable and Mr. Betteridge's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in 
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holding Mr. Betteridge in contempt for failing to abide by the order of the court, entering 
a judgment for alimony arrearages, and awarding Ms. Betteridge her attorney fees and 
costs incurred, must fail. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to make 
findings of contempt, impose sanctions punishing contempt, award judgments for 
arrearages in court ordered payments, and award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing 
party. 
Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal. Ms. Betteridge prevailed below and was 
awarded attorney fees and costs, and should be awarded her attorney fees and costs 
incurred in defending this appeal. Mr. Betteridge fails to make a good faith argument 
that the trial court's finding that no cohabitation existed was clearly erroneous. He 
merely reargues the case he made to the trial court. 
Mr. Betteridge should be Sanctioned for Bringing a Frivolous Appeal and For 
Disregard of the Court's Rule. Mr. Betteridge failed to marshal the evidence to meet his 
burden of showing that the findings were clearly erroneous. He simply disagrees with the 
trial court's assessment of the weight of the evidence. There is no reasonable legal or 
factual basis for this appeal. The history of this case demonstrates that Mr. Betteridge 
has engaged in repeated appeals and has persistently refused to obey the order of the 
court regarding payment of alimony. The only alimony collected from Mr. Betteridge 
has been through garnishment or court ordered deduction from his paycheck. Ms. 
Betteridge has been required to incur significant legal fees in the enforcement of her 
rights and entitlements as awarded by the court. Significant court resources have been 
expended as a result of Mr. Betteridge's refusal to abide by the order of the court. 
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Further, Mr. Betteridge has abused the Rules of Appellate Procedure in the manner in 
which his brief on this appeal was filed, and within the filed brief, has obfuscated and 
mischaracterized the issues in attempt to mislead the court and provide legitimacy to his 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
In challenging the adequacy of the findings made by the trial court, Mr. Betteridge 
must show that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 
2001 UT App 44 t 10 n. 5, 19 P.3d 1005, 1008; Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 913 (Utah 
App. 1995). He must do more than merely reargue facts supporting his position. Sigg, at 
913, n. 7. He is required to present in comprehensive and fastidious order every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the finding that there was no 
common residence for Ms. Betteridge and Jonnathen Reinen, and that there was no 
sexual conduct which was conjugal in nature. The appellate court will review the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Id. at 910, n. 2. Then he is 
obliged to demonstrate that despite that evidence the court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence thus making them clearly 
erroneous. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App at^j 10, n. 5. 
Mr. Betteridge has failed to adequately marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence the findings are so 
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lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them 
clearly erroneous. 
A. Elements of Cohabitation. 
"Cohabitation is comprised of the same two elements: (1) common residency and 
(2) sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 
669, 672 (Utah 1985); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah App. 1996). 
Both elements must be established by a preponderance of the evidence in order to arrive 
at the conclusion that cohabitation exists. In his attempt to marshal the evidence 
pertaining to these two elements Mr. Betteridge identifies only some of the testimony of 
Ms. Betteridge and Mr. Reinen, fails to cite to any of the testimony of the 11 other 
witnesses, and simply re-argues his position at trial. 
B. Common Residency. 
Mr. Betteridge argues that Mr. Reinen paid rent so it must be deemed admitted by 
this fact alone, that Ms. Betteridge's apartment became a common residence. This 
argument disregards the factual analysis required in Utah upon which a finding of 
common residency must be based. The Utah Supreme Court requires a showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence of a sharing of a common abode that both parties consider 
their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time. Haddow, 101 
P.2d at 672. The holding in Haddow was applied to the facts in Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 
160 when the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding on the element of 
common residency. The determinative factors applied in Pendleton centered upon the 
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nature of the use of and access to the premises, and were whether the other party had a 
key and could come and go as he pleased and whether he regularly spent time in the 
premises in the absence of the other and was not merely a guest. The facts in Pendleton 
included possession of a key, and a practice of coming and going from the residence 
regardless of the presence of the other. Id. 
Here, the trial court, having heard all of the testimony of all of the 
witnesses, stated 
I found more than credible the testimony that the young man, 
Jonnathen, was basically engaged in residing temporarily in 
the apartment of Ms. Betteridge as essentially an overflow 
area because of the extreme crowded conditions of his own 
apartment. I'm not satisfied from the evidence that that ever 
became his principal domicile. 
I'm persuaded after asking questions searchingly and hearing 
the testimony searchingly that he never had a key. That he 
was not over there except on rare occasions when Ms. 
Betteridge wasn't. That that wasn't part of the relationship 
that they had. That she basically didn't want him there when 
she wasn't there, and that wasn't his intention or practice to 
do so. 
In addition to that, it wouldn't appear to this Court that there 
was an established ongoing relationship. This was something 
that was temporary. I don't think the evidence establishes 
anything to the contrary. 
I don't have the impression that Jonnathen came and went, 
but rather he'd go there for the night, but wasn't the sort of 
thing where that was kind of the place he really hung out 
most of the time. 
It's clear that Ms. Betteridge and Jonnathen ate meals 
together from time to time. That they went out together. 
There's some dispute as to how much, but to me the evidence 
on that again doesn't establish this practice that they ate 
almost all meals together. 
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There was clearly no financial comingling. In short, it seems 
to me that even though there was certainly a credible case 
presented, and I recognize that Mr. Betteridge's case had a 
code argument, it wasn't frivolous, that still that the burden 
was not met to establish common residency. 
[Tr. 297:23-25; 298; 299:1-3] 
Mr. Betteridge has failed to marshal all of the evidence that the arrangement was 
temporary and in fact terminated after 3-1/2 months, and all of the evidence regarding 
Jonnathen's restricted use of and access to the apartment. Further, he fails to demonstrate 
how all of the evidence so marshaled fails to support the trial court's finding that the 
arrangement was temporary and that no common residency existed. It is well established 
that the lower court's finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that 
it is clearly erroneous. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44 at \ 10 n. 5; Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 1999 UT App 130, If 8; 977 P.2d 1226, 1228; Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 
12, U 24; 973 P.2d 431,436-7. 
C. Sexual Conduct Evidencing a Conjugal Association. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that sexual contact in the cohabitation context 
means "participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally 
existing between husband and wife." Haddow, 101 P.2d at 672. See also, Knuteson v. 
Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980). In the Haddow opinion, the court evaluated 
the nature and extent of sexual contact between the parties and noted that the parties had 
been dating exclusively for about fourteen months, had engaged in the practice of 
spending the night together at lease once a week, had vacationed together to Hawaii and 
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had stayed the night together in Elko, Nevada during that period of time. The trial court's 
finding of cohabitation was reversed by the Supreme Court holding that while the facts 
established the presence of a relatively permanent sexual relationship, common residency 
had not been established. Id. 
Here, the trial court, having heard all of the testimony of all of the witnesses, 
stated 
Likewise on the issue of sexual conduct evidencing a 
conjugal association, there was certainly no direct evidence of 
any sexual conduct. That was denied vehemently by 
Jonnathen and Ms. Betteridge. That's something that was not 
something either one admitted to. 
The evidence we had came from Mr. Lee who, to say the 
least, presented to this Court a person who seemed to be 
disturbed and have some kind of an obsessive relationship 
with Ms. Betteridge that clouded his credibility in the Court's 
mind, and certainly made what he had to say something less 
than completely believable. 
The best that he had to say was, you know, lights were going 
off and on, as Ms. Woresewaren's testified, but you know, 
Ms. Worsewaren's testimony had to do with one evening, 
observing until 11 o'clock at night. That doesn't seem to me 
to make a case for sexual contact, nor does Mr. Lee's 
observations of that, in the face of the parties denying it and 
no credible testimony otherwise coming to this Court's 
attention. 
There's clearly some kind of a romantic interest or 
relationship. There were the pictures, the gifts, the kissing, 
the attention and all of that, but I'm just not persuaded that 
that alone establishes sexual conduct evidencing a conjugal 
association. To draw that leap seems to me to be unfounded, 
and I don't believe the evidence supports it. 
[Tr. 299:4-25; 300:1-3] 
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Mr. Betteridge has failed to marshal the evidence that a relatively permanent 
sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife existed 
between Ms. Betteridge and Mr. Reinen. Further, he fails to demonstrate how all of the 
evidence fails to support the trial court's finding that no such relatively permanent sexual 
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife was proven. In the 
absence of a showing that it is clearly erroneous the lower court's finding of fact should 
not be disturbed on appeal. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44 at \ 10 n. 5; Kessimakis, 1999 
UT App 130 at f 8; Moon, 1999 Ut. App 12 at \ 24. 
Having failed to marshal the evidence and demonstrate that the findings of the trial 
court on each of the required elements constituting cohabitation are clearly erroneous, the 
order and judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
II. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The sound exercise of discretion requires the trial court to correctly apply the law 
to the facts. Unlike the trial court in Garcia v. Garcia, 2002 UT App 381 ffl[ 6, 7, 8; 60 
P.3d 1174, 1175-1176, there is no assertion here that the provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-
5(9) were incorrectly interpreted. 
A. Conclusion that Alimony Did Not Terminate. 
Mr. Betteridge's failure to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous means that the fact that no cohabitation existed must be 
accepted as true. Moon, 1999 UT App 12 at \ 24. Accordingly, if no cohabitation 
exists, the statutory provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-5(9) that terminate alimony upon a 
finding of cohabitation are not triggered. After making its determination that 
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cohabitation did not exist, the trial court did not abuse is discretion in concluding that the 
provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-5(9) did not apply. 
B. Finding of Contempt. 
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to make findings of contempt and 
impose sanctions punishing contempt. Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 
(Utah 1976); Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, If 8; 973 P.2d 988, 990. 
Mr. Betteridge argues that the trial court abused its discretion in holding Mr. 
Betteridge in contempt for failing to abide by the order of the court, for the sole reason 
that it erred in failing to find cohabitation thus triggering the termination provisions of 
Utah Code § 30-3-5(9). Mr. Betteridge advances a theory based upon nunc pro tunc 
powers or the equitable remedy of void ab initio that by asserting a defense of 
cohabitation against a motion for enforcement of a court order requiring payment of 
alimony, he should not be found in contempt even when the cohabitation claim fails. The 
plain wording of the statute is not in dispute that alimony terminates when the 
cohabitation commenced. But if cohabitation is not proven to exist then alimony does 
not terminate. Raising the defense of cohabitation, even in good faith, would not 
immunize the delinquent alimony obligor from the contemptuous behavior. A finding of 
contempt is within the sound discretion of the court when it appears that the obligor knew 
of the existence of the order requiring him to pay, that the obligor had the ability to pay, 
and that the obligor refused to pay. Mr. Betteridge makes no argument that the court's 
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action is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse 
of discretion. 
In this case the trial court found on undisputed facts that Mr. Betteridge knew of 
the existence of the order requiring him to pay, that Mr. Betteridge had the ability to pay, 
and that Mr. Betteridge refused to pay. [Rec. 831; Tr. p. 85:3-10]. However, the trial 
court further exercised its discretion in recognizing Mr. Betteridge9s claim of 
cohabitation as a reason for not payment in the trial court's choice of sanctions for the 
contempt, and ordered that Mr. Betteridge could purge himself of the contempt by paying 
$800.00 per paycheck to Ms. Betteridge. [Rec. 831; Tr. p. 93:3-18; Rec. 593-596] 
Mr. Betteridge's failure to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous means that the fact that no cohabitation existed must be 
accepted as true. Moon, 1999 UT App 12 at U 24. Accordingly, if no cohabitation 
exists, the statutory provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-5(9) that terminate alimony upon a 
finding of cohabitation are not triggered. The order of the trial court finding contempt 
should be affirmed. 
C. Entering a judgment for alimony arrearages. 
It is within the sound discretion of the court to enter a judgment for unpaid 
alimony. Mr. Betteridge's only dispute with the entry of the judgment against him for 
alimony arrears which accrued from November, 2002 through June, 2003 is his insistence 
that the trial court was wrong in finding no cohabitation and thus alimony should have 
terminated as a matter of law. 
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Mr. Betteridge's failure to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous means that the fact that no cohabitation existed must be 
accepted as true. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ^ f 24. Accordingly, if no cohabitation exists, 
the statutory provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-5(9) that terminate alimony upon a finding 
of cohabitation are not triggered. The alimony accrued and was not paid and the order of 
the trial court entering judgment for the alimony arrearages should be affirmed. 
D. Award of attorney fees and costs to Ms. Betteridge. 
In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree an award of attorney fees 
is based solely upon the trial court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the 
moving party. Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030, n. 4. (Utah App. 1992). Mr. 
Betteridge's only dispute with the award of attorney fees and costs to Ms. Betteridge 
[Rec. 588-590] is that his insistence that she should not have been the prevailing party. 
Mr. Betteridge's failure to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous means that the fact that no cohabitation existed must be 
accepted as true. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 24. Accordingly, if no cohabitation exists, 
the statutory provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-5(9) that terminate alimony upon a finding 
of cohabitation are not triggered. The order of the trial court awarding attorney fees and 
costs should be affirmed. 
m . AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Ms. Betteridge prevailed against the defense of cohabitation below and was 
awarded her attorney fees and costs and should be awarded her attorney fees and costs 
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incurred in defending this appeal. Moon, 1999 UT App 012 f 33; Lyngle, 831 P.2d at 
1031, n. 4. Mr. Betteridge failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 24. He merely reargues the 
case he made to the trial court. 
IV. MR. BETTERIDGE SHOULD BE SANCTIONED FOR BRINGING 
A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL AND FOR ABUSE OF THE COURT'S 
RULES 
A. Frivolous Appeal. 
Mr. Betteridge failed to marshal the evidence and failed to meet his burden of 
demonstrating that despite that evidence the court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence thus making them clearly erroneous. 
Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 10, n. 5. Mr. Betteridge simply disagrees with the trial 
court's assessment of the weight and import of the evidence. There was no reasonable 
legal or factual basis for this appeal. Backstrom Family Ltd. P'ship v. Hall, 751 P.2d 
1157,1160 (Ut. App. 1988). 
The history of this case as shown in the Record on Appeal demonstrates that Mr. 
Betteridge has engaged in repeated appeals and has persistently refused to obey the order 
of the court regarding payment of alimony. The only alimony collected from Mr. 
Betteridge has been through garnishment or court ordered deduction from his paycheck. 
His refusal to pay resulted in considerable financial hardship to Ms. Betteridge and she 
has been required to incur significant legal fees in seeking the enforcement of her rights 
and entitlements as awarded by the court. Significant court resources have been 
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expended as a result of Mr. Betteridge's refusal to abide by the order of the court. Mr. 
Betteridge's course of conduct is similar to that observed by this court in Porco v. Porco, 
752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988) and similar relief should be awarded to Ms. Betteridge. 
B. Abuse of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Mr. Betteridge has abused the Rules of Appellate Procedure in the manner in 
which his brief on this appeal was filed, and within the filed brief, has obfuscated and 
mischaracterized the issues in an attempt to mislead the court and provide legitimacy to 
his appeal. 
Rule 24, Rules of Appellate Procedure, which proscribes the form of briefs such as 
paper size, margins, typeface, binding, color of cover, and contents of cover, provides 
that the clerk may reject a brief which is not prepared in accordance with the rules and 
the party may have five (5) days to bring the brief into compliance with the rules. The 
rule is not intended to permit significant substantive changes in briefs. Rule 24(e) 
A comparison of the brief "lodged" with the court on June 2, 2004 with the brief 
"filed" on June 9, 2004 shows significant substantive changes in the section entitled 
"Statement of Facts". The June 2, 2004 brief contains 11 statements at pp. 4-5, none of 
which reference the location in the Record or Transcript, compared with 27 statements of 
fact in the June 9, 2004 brief at pp. 3-7. Further significant substantive changes appear in 
Argument I on pp. 6-7 of the June 2,2004 brief when compared to pp. 9-13 in the June 9, 
2004 brief; and significant substantive changes appear in Argument II on p. 9 of the June 
2, 2004 brief when compared to p. 14 of the June 9, 2004 brief. 
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Further, in Statement of Facts 1, 2, 5, 23, and 24 contained in the June 9, 2004 
brief Mr. Betteridge has obfuscated and mischaracterized the facts and issues in an 
attempt to mislead the court and provide legitimacy to his appeal. 
Appropriate sanctions should be imposed against Mr. Betteridge for filing a 
frivolous appeal and for abuse of the rules of appellate procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact that there was no common residency and no 
sexual conduct evidencing a conjugal association should be affirmed. The trial court's 
conclusion of law that no cohabitation existed should be affirmed. The order of the trial 
court finding Mr. Betteridge in contempt should be affirmed. The order of the trial court 
granting Ms. Betteridge judgment for alimony arrearages and awarding her attorneys fees 
and costs should be affirmed. 
Ms. Betteridge should be awarded her attorney fees and costs incurred in this 
appeal. 
Mr. Betteridge should be sanctioned for abusing the court process and for filing a 
frivolous appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of July, 2004. 
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Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
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